By Dr. Bakary Sambe*
At the end of April 2025, Timbuktu Institute published a report entitled “The JNIM Threat in the three-border area of Mali, Mauritania and Senegal”. This scientific publication, the first of its kind and following a number of field surveys in eastern Senegal carried out by researchers from this leading think tank on regional security issues, raised a great deal of debate about the issues involved. Media coverage of the report had so far focused on Senegal’s vulnerability to the advance of terrorist groups from western Mali. In this article, Dr. Bakary Sambe, President of the Timbuktu Institute, looks back at the resilience factors he suggests Senegalese authorities and their partners strengthen in a volatile regional context full of risks.
The tri-border region of Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal has emerged as a strategic hotspot for Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), a terrorist group seeking to expand its influence beyond Mali. While Senegal faces vulnerabilities such as porous borders, socio-economic challenges, and the spread of Salafism, the country possesses robust resilience factors that have so far limited JNIM’s infiltration. These include strong social cohesion, widespread religious moderation, and competent security forces. By reinforcing these strengths through targeted policies, Senegal can further fortify its defenses against JNIM’s expansion, as outlined in a recent Timbuktu Institute report.
Senegal’s Resilience Factors
- Social Cohesion as a Cultural Shield
Senegal’s diverse ethnic and religious communities exhibit remarkable social cohesion, which acts as a bulwark against JNIM’s divisive tactics. According to a 2024 Timbuktu Institute survey, 75% of residents in the Kédougou region attribute Senegal’s social peace to its cultural traditions, with only 13% believing inter-community tensions could drive individuals toward violent extremism. Mixed marriages and mutual respect among groups like the Bassari, Bédik, and Peul create a cultural shield, recognized by UNESCO’s designation of parts of Kédougou as a World Heritage Site for its model of peaceful coexistence. Unlike in Mali and Burkina Faso, where JNIM has exploited tensions between herders and sedentary groups, Senegal’s harmonious inter-community relations make it difficult for the group to gain traction.
- Widespread Religious Moderation
Senegal’s adherence to moderate Islamic teachings, particularly those of Sufi brotherhoods, counters JNIM’s radical Salafist ideology. The majority of Senegalese, including those in border regions like Kédougou, Matam, and Tambacounda, follow community-focused religious practices that emphasize self-improvement over divisive ideologies. Only 4% of residents in these regions know someone who shares JNIM’s extremist views, and religious leaders are seen as key actors in preventing radicalization, second only to the government. While Sufi influence is less pronounced in eastern border areas, the absence of widespread radicalization and the collaborative efforts of religious leaders with government and community figures bolster resilience.
- Competent and Professional Security Forces
Senegal’s security forces are a cornerstone of its resilience, distinguished by their professionalism, size, and counterinsurgency experience. Comparable in scale to Mali and Niger’s forces despite Senegal’s smaller population and territory, they benefit from specialized training and a strong reputation for non-interference in politics. Their experience in the Casamance conflict and UN peacekeeping missions equips them to counter threats like JNIM effectively. Positive civil-military relations further enhance their effectiveness, with 55% of eastern border residents willing to share information about extremist activities with security forces. Recent efforts, such as the establishment of a permanent base in Goudiry and joint patrols with Mali and Mauritania, demonstrate proactive engagement.
Strategies to Reinforce Resilience
To counter JNIM’s expansion, Senegal must build on these resilience factors through strategic measures that enhance security, community awareness, and socio-economic inclusion. The Timbuktu Institute report offers several recommendations to achieve this:
- Increase Security Presence in Border Regions
Strengthening the permanent presence of security forces along the Falémé River and key cross-border routes, such as those near Bakel and Saraya, is critical. While the Goudiry base is a step forward, temporary operations like Niokolo and Nawetan have not significantly improved local perceptions of security. Permanent bases would enable rapid deployment of specialized units to combat smuggling and illicit economies, which are JNIM’s primary funding sources. Enhanced presence would also foster better intelligence-gathering through stronger ties with local communities, who are willing to report suspicious activities. For instance, residents in Guémédié have expressed readiness to share information about potential infiltrations, an opportunity security forces can leverage.
- Strengthen Cross-Border Cooperation
Institutionalizing cooperation with Mali and Mauritania is essential to disrupt JNIM’s cross-border networks. The report highlights JNIM’s logistical bases in Mali’s Kayes region and unofficial crossings along the Falémé River, underscoring the need for coordinated efforts. Senegal should expand on recent initiatives, such as the February 2025 military cooperation agreements with Mali and joint river patrols with Mauritania, by creating binational and trinational task forces. These should integrate army, police, and intelligence capabilities to target JNIM’s supply points and transport networks. Establishing designated intelligence-sharing contacts and processes will ensure timely responses to suspicious movements, enhancing the tri-border region’s security.
- Conduct Awareness Campaigns with Community Leaders
Raising awareness about JNIM’s threat is crucial, as a third of residents in Kédougou, Matam, and Tambacounda are unaware of its potential impact, per the 2024 Timbuktu Institute survey. The government should partner with religious leaders, traditional chiefs, and local authorities to conduct campaigns that highlight JNIM’s violent tactics and intolerance, contrasting them with Senegal’s values of tolerance and cohesion. In areas where Sufi influence is limited, such as parts of Kédougou and Tambacounda, traditional chiefs and reformist actors can play a pivotal role. Training these leaders in communication strategies will amplify the government’s legitimacy and reach, fostering a collective community response to JNIM’s infiltration attempts.
- Strengthen Socio-Economic Integration Programs
Addressing socio-economic vulnerabilities, particularly unemployment and marginalization, is vital to reducing JNIM’s appeal. The 2024 Timbuktu Institute survey identifies unemployment as the primary reason (85%) why individuals might join extremist groups in border regions. The government should expand programs like PUMA and PUDC to improve road infrastructure, reducing geographical isolation in Kédougou and Tambacounda. Vocational training in sustainable agriculture and micro-credit programs, such as those under the Delegation générale à l’Entreprenariat Rapide (DER), can empower youth and women, key demographics vulnerable to JNIM’s recruitment. Additionally, regulating the mining sector to ensure equitable access to resources will address grievances against foreign companies, reducing the risk of JNIM exploiting local discontent.
Senegal’s resilience against JNIM’s expansion rests on its strong social cohesion, religious moderation, and professional security forces. By reinforcing these strengths through increased security presence, enhanced cross-border cooperation, community awareness campaigns, and socio-economic integration programs, Senegal can further limit JNIM’s ability to infiltrate its territory. These measures will not only protect national security but also preserve the country’s model of cultural and religious harmony, ensuring that JNIM’s divisive tactics find no foothold in Senegal’s border regions.
*Dr. Bakary Sambe is the President of the Timbuktu Institute – African Center for Peace Studies
